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Abstract ― This article investigates agglomeration processes in aging societies by 
introducing an overlapping generation structure into a New Economic Geography 
model. Whether higher economic integration leads to spatial concentration of economic 
activity crucially hinges on the economies' demographic properties. While population 
aging as represented by declining birth rates strengthens agglomeration processes, 
declining mortality rates weaken them. This is due to the fact that we allow for 
nonconstant population size. In particular, we show that population growth acts as an 
important dispersion force that augments the distributional effects on agglomeration 
processes resulting from the turnover of generations. 
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1 Introduction
With the ongoing worldwide economic integration during the last decades,
economists’ and policy makers’ interest in the location of economic activity
has dramatically risen (see e.g. Fujita and Thisse (2002) and the World
Bank (2009)’s development report on economic geography). Within the
European Union for example, regional cohesion policies targeted at a more
equal spatial allocation of resources are on top of the political agenda. At the
same time, as illustrated in the special report on aging populations of The
Economist (2009), demographic change has been creating serious economic
challenges for industrialized countries. In particular, declining fertility has
caused upward shifts in the mean age of most countries’ populations while
simultaneously reducing population growth rates (see Eurostat (2004) and
United Nations (2007)).
Up to now, these two issues have been analyzed independently of each
other, with the New Economic Geography (NEG) addressing the impact
of deeper economic integration on the spatial concentration of productive
factors and overlapping generation (OLG) models investigating the effects
of demography on macroeconomic aggregates. This division is unfortunate
since both demographic change and economic integration crucially influence
demand patterns which themselves are - via the returns to productive fac-
tors - decisive for the spatial distribution of economic activity. Explaining
agglomeration processes without accounting for demographic developments
thus misses a fundamental point.
Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009) have made a first step to-
ward closing this gap by merging these two research strands and for the
first time providing a unified framework within which the linkage between
demographic change and agglomeration can be accurately analyzed. In par-
ticular, the have shown that introducing an overlapping generation setting
where individuals face lifetime uncertainty considerably reduces agglomer-
ation tendencies. By equalizing the birth to the death rate, their frame-
work, however, can only analyze the effects of changes in the population age
structure while ignoring the impacts of varying population growth due to
demographic change. Since declining fertility leads to decreasing population
growth rates while lower mortality rates imply higher population growth, it
is essential to reassess the impact of demographic change on the location of
2
industries in a setting with nonconstant population size. Having this purpose
in mind, the model presented in this paper extends Grafeneder-Weissteiner
and Prettner (2009)’s approach by allowing for nonequal birth and mortality
rates and thus growing populations. In particular, we generalize Baldwin
(1999)’s constructed capital model by incorporating Buiter (1988)’s over-
lapping generation structure to arrive at a NEG framework featuring both
population aging and varying population size.
In Baldwin (1999)’s constructed capital model concentration of eco-
nomic activity is explained via a demand-linked circular causality whose
pro-agglomerative effect is strongest for high levels of economic integration.
In particular, with interregionally immobile capital, a higher capital stock
raises capital income and thus expenditures which leads to an increase in
the capital rental rate and therefore to further capital accumulation. Since
higher capital accumulation is typically associated with medium-run growth,
this two-region neoclassical growth framework illustrates how economic inte-
gration can lead to the emergence of “rust” and “boom belts”. Its intertem-
porally optimized saving features moreover allow an easy incorporation of
overlapping generations with individuals that face a positive probability of
death and differ with respect to their age. By using Buiter (1988)’s over-
lapping generation structure, demographic change capturing both changes
in the population age structure and/or in the population growth rate can
be analyzed via variations in either the birth or the mortality rates. In
particular, we can analyze a situation of population aging and declining
population growth rates as recently faced by many industrialized countries.
Overall, our modeling strategy does not only allow us to accurately analyze
agglomeration processes in aging societies but also provides us with a more
convincing description of reality compared to Baldwin (1999)’s setting with
one infinitely lived individual.
Our results show that the possibility of agglomeration crucially hinges
on the economies’ demographic properties, i.e. on the birth and mortal-
ity rate. While declining birth rates strengthen agglomeration processes,
declining mortality rates weaken them. These differential effects on the
stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium are due to the opposite
impact of changes in the birth and mortality rate on the population size.
Lower birth rates decrease the population growth rate, while lower mor-
tality rates increase it. Since population growth weakens the wealth and
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thus expenditure increase due to a higher capital stock, it acts as an im-
portant dispersion force. For declining birth rates, the population growth
based channel therefore strengthens the pro-agglomerative effects of a lower
turnover of generations first identified by Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Pret-
tner (2009), while for declining mortality rates the implied increase in the
population growth rate counteracts and even dominates the impacts via the
turnover channel.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents
the model framework and derives the equilibrium laws of motion for capital
and expenditures. Section 3 first verifies the existence of a symmetric long-
run equilibrium and then investigates its stability properties. In doing so,
we can not only analyze agglomeration processes in aging societies but also
isolate the population growth based effect on agglomeration. Finally, section
4 contains concluding remarks and sketches possible lines of further research.
2 The model
This section describes how we integrate Buiter (1988)’s overlapping genera-
tion structure with growing populations into the constructed capital frame-
work of Baldwin (1999) to arrive at a NEG framework allowing for both
population aging and varying population size.
There are two symmetric regions or countries, denoted as H (home) and
F (foreign)1, with identical production technologies, trade costs, preferences
of individuals, labor endowments and demographic structures. Each region
has three economic sectors (agriculture, manufacturing and investment) with
two immobile factors (labor L and capital K) at their disposal.
The homogeneous agricultural good, which is also the numeraire good
and denoted as z, is produced under constant returns to scale in a perfectly
competitive market using labor as the only input with, by choice of units,
an input coefficient of one. It can be freely traded between the two regions.
Manufacturing firms behave as in the monopolistic competition frame-
work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and therefore produce horizontally differen-
1If further distinction is needed, foreign variables are moreover indicated by an asterisk.
In particular, the superscript F denotes that a good was produced in the foreign region,
whereas the asterisk indicates that it is consumed in the foreign region. In what follows,
emphasis will be on the home region. The corresponding expressions for the foreign region
can be derived by symmetry.
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tiated varieties, m, with one unit of capital as fixed input and a variable per
unit requirement of am units of labor. A continuum of varieties i ∈ (0, VH ]
is produced at home, whereas a continuum of varieties j ∈ (0, VF ] is man-
ufactured in the foreign region. In contrast to the agricultural good, trade
of manufactures involves iceberg transport costs such that ϕ ≥ 1 units of a
certain good have to be shipped in order to sell one unit abroad (see e.g.
Baldwin et al. (2003)). Firms thus face an increasing returns to scale pro-
duction technology with an associated cost function pi + wamYm(i), where
pi is the capital rental rate representing the fixed cost, w is the wage per
efficiency unit of labor and Ym(i) is total output of one manufacturing good
producer.
In the Walrasian investment sector, capital, i.e. machines, are produced
using labor as the only input with an input coefficient of ai. Wages of the
workers are paid out of individuals’ savings. Following Baldwin (1999), a
share δ > 0 of the capital stock depreciates at each instant.
Concerning the overlapping generation structure of our model economy,
we closely follow Buiter (1988). We assume that at each point in time,
τ ∈ [0,∞), a large cohort consisting of new individuals is born. Newborns
receive no bequests and thus start their lives without any wealth. Each indi-
vidual’s time of death is stochastic with an exponential probability density
function parameterized by the constant instantaneous mortality rate µ > 0.
Normalizing initial population size N(0) to one, the size of the cohort born
at t0 at a certain point in time τ is N(t0, τ) = βeβt0e−µτ (see appendix A.1)2,
where β > 0 is the constant birth rate. Consequently, total population size
at time τ is given by
N(τ) =
∫ τ
−∞
N(t0, τ)dt0
=
∫ τ
−∞
βeβt0e−µτdt0
= e(β−µ)τ , (1)
where we denote its growth rate as n ≡ β − µ.
Since there is no heterogeneity between members of the same cohort, each
cohort can be described by one representative individual, who inelastically
2In what follows the first time index of a variable will refer to the birth date, whereas
the second will indicate a certain point in time.
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supplies her efficiency units of labor l on the labor market with perfect
mobility across sectors but immobility between regions. Finally, as in Yaari
(1965), individuals can insure themselves against the risk of dying with
positive assets by buying actuarial notes of a fair life insurance company
which are canceled upon their death.
2.1 Individual consumption behavior
Preferences over the agricultural good and a CES composite of the manu-
facturing varieties are Cobb-Douglas. The representative individual of the
cohort born at t0 chooses at each instant τ > t0 consumption of the agricul-
tural good, cz(t0, τ), consumption of varieties produced at home, cHm(i, t0, τ),
and consumption of varieties produced abroad, cFm(j, t0, τ), to maximize her
expected lifetime utility at time t03
U(t0, t0) =
∫ ∞
t0
e−(ρ+µ)(τ−t0) ln
[
(cz(t0, τ))1−ξ(caggm (t0, τ))
ξ
]
dτ, (2)
where ρ > 0 is the rate of pure time preference, 0 < ξ < 1 is the manufac-
turing share of consumption and
caggm (t0, τ) ≡
[∫ VH(τ)
0
(
cHm(i, t0, τ)
)σ−1
σ di+
∫ VF (τ)
0
(
cFm(j, t0, τ)
)σ−1
σ dj
] σ
σ−1
represents consumption of the CES composite with σ > 1 being the elasticity
of substitution between varieties.
The wealth constraint of a representative individual is given by
k˙(t0, τ) =
w(τ)l + pi(τ)k(t0, τ)− e(t0, τ)
w(τ)ai
+ µk(t0, τ)− δk(t0, τ), (3)
where k(t0, τ) is the individual capital stock and e(t0, τ) are individual ex-
penditures for consumption defined as
e(t0, τ) ≡ pz(τ)cz(t0, τ) +
∫ VH(τ)
0
pHm(i, τ)c
H
m(i, t0, τ)di+∫ VF (τ)
0
pFm,ϕ(j, τ)c
F
m(j, t0, τ)dj.
3Equation (2) can be easily derived by calculating expected lifetime utility, where
the date of death is a random variable with an exponential probability density function
parameterized by a constant instantaneous mortality rate µ.
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Here pz(τ) is the price of the agricultural good, pHm(i, τ) the price of a manu-
factured variety produced at home and pFm,ϕ(j, τ) the price of a manufactured
variety produced abroad with the subscript ϕ indicating the dependence on
transport costs. This wealth constraint displays the structure of the invest-
ment sector by showing that individual savings, defined as income minus
consumption expenditures, are transformed into capital.
The law of motion for capital given in equation (3) is based on Yaari
(1965)’s full insurance result implying that individuals save solely in the
form of actuarial notes from the life insurance company, whose fair rate
exceeds the market rate of return on capital, pi(τ)w(τ)ai − δ, by µ (see Yaari
(1965)).
The individual’s utility optimization problem can be solved by applying
a three stage procedure.4 The first stage analyzes the dynamic savings-
expenditure decision and results in the Euler equation for the representative
individual of the cohort born at t0
e˙(t0, τ)
e(t0, τ)
=
pi(τ)
aiw(τ)
− δ − ρ. (4)
Stage two and three finally deal with the static optimal consumption alloca-
tion between the CES composite and the agricultural good as well as with
the allocation of consumption to each of the varieties. Altogether this leads
to the following demand functions for the agricultural good and for each of
the manufactured varieties
cz(t0, τ) =
(1− ξ)e(t0, τ)
pz(τ)
, (5)
cHm(i, t0, τ) =
ξe(t0, τ)(pHm(i, τ))
−σ[∫ VH(τ)
0 (p
H
m(i, τ))1−σdi+
∫ VF (τ)
0 (p
F
m,ϕ(j, τ))1−σdj
] , (6)
cFm(j, t0, τ) =
ξe(t0, τ)(pFm,ϕ(j, τ))
−σ[∫ VH(τ)
0 (p
H
m(i, τ))1−σdi+
∫ VF (τ)
0 (p
F
m,ϕ(j, τ))1−σdj
] . (7)
2.2 Aggregation
Due to the overlapping generation structure, our model setup does not fea-
ture one single representative individual. Corresponding to any individual
variable we thus define population aggregates that follow from aggregating
4For details of the derivations see Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009)
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up over all cohorts. For capital and expenditures, these aggregation rules
are formally given by
K(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
k(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0,
= βe−µt
∫ t
−∞
k(t0, t)eβt0dt0, (8)
E(t) ≡
∫ t
−∞
e(t0, t)N(t0, t)dt0,
= βe−µt
∫ t
−∞
e(t0, t)eβt0dt0, (9)
where K(t) is the aggregate capital stock and E(t) denotes aggregate con-
sumption expenditures.5
For each population aggregate variable X(t), the corresponding quantity
per capita is defined by x˜(t) = X(t)e−nt (see Buiter (1988)). Using this no-
tational convention, we derive in appendix A.2 the following laws of motion
for per capita expenditures e˜(t) and per capita capital k˜(t)
˙˜e(t) =
[
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − ρ
]
˜e(t)− β(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)k˜(t), (10)
˙˜
k(t) =
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − β + µ
)
k˜(t) +
l˜
ai
− e˜(t)
w(t)ai
, (11)
where analogous equations hold in the foreign region. In contrast to the set-
ting with a constant population size of Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner
(2009), where the mortality rate only enters the aggregate Euler equation,
demographic parameters appear in both laws of motion. In particular, the
law of motion of per capita expenditures differs from the individual Eu-
ler equation by −β(ρ + µ)aiw(t)k˜(t). Rewriting equation (10) as (see also
appendix A.2)
˙˜e(t)
e˜(t)
=
e˙(t0, τ)
e(t0, τ)
− β e˜(t)− e(t, t)
e˜(t)
(12)
sheds more light on how to explain the emergence of this additional term.
As explained in detail in Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009) for the
case of a constant population size, the difference between individual and per
capita consumption expenditure growth is due to the distributional effects of
5Note that aggregate efficiency units of labor are accordingly given by L(t) = le(β−µ)t.
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the turnover of generations. At each instant in time a fraction µ of wealthier
individuals with high consumption expenditures dies6 and is replaced by a
fraction β of newborns without capital holdings and thus lower consumption
expenditures. This continually ongoing process captured by the difference
between average consumption expenditures e˜(t) and consumption expendi-
tures of newborns e(t, t) slows down per capita consumption expenditure
growth (aggregate economy average) relative to individual consumption ex-
penditure growth.
Whereas both the birth and the mortality rate strengthen the turnover
correction term and thus decrease per capita expenditure growth7, their
effects on the per capita law of motion of capital are of opposite sign. Ob-
viously, it is in fact the population growth rate n = β − µ that enters the
per capita law of motion for capital. A higher n decreases per capita ac-
cumulation by decreasing the market rate of return on capital. It is not
surprising that this last relationship will become crucial when investigating
the effects of population growth on agglomeration tendencies. To do so, we
first have to determine the equilibrium factor prices resulting out of profit
maximization in order to arrive at a dynamic system for expenditures and
capital that fully describes the evolution of our economy.
2.3 Profit maximization
Profit maximization and perfect competition in the agricultural sector imply
that the price of an agricultural good equals its marginal cost. Since labor
is perfectly mobile across sectors, the wage rate in the economy is thus
pinned down by the price of the agricultural good. Free trade equalizes this
price and thus wages across regions as long as each region produces some
agricultural output which will be assumed from now on.8 We thus have
w(t) = w∗(t) = 1, (13)
since the agricultural good has been chosen as the numeraire.
6Due to the law of large numbers, the individual probability of dying is equal to the
fraction of individuals who die at each instant.
7Recall that by equalizing the birth to the death rate, Grafeneder-Weissteiner and
Prettner (2009) were not able to differentiate between the impact of varying birth and
mortality rates, i.e. only µ appeared in the turnover correction term.
8See Baldwin (1999) for details on this assumption.
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Profit maximization in the monopolistically competitive manufacturing
sector9 yields
pHm(i, t) =
σ
σ − 1w(t)am, (14)
pFm,ϕ(i, t) = p
H
m(i, t)ϕ. (15)
Prices are equal to a constant markup over marginal costs and mill pricing
is optimal, i.e. the only difference between prices in the two regions is due
to transport costs (see e.g. Baldwin et al. (2003)).
Since there is free entry into the manufacturing sector, pure profits will be
driven down to zero. Consequently, the capital rental rate, which represents
the fixed costs of each manufacturing firm, is pinned down by the level of
operating profits. Using optimal prices given in equations (14) and (15)
together with equations (6) and (7) and redefining global quantities and
regional share variables10 gives operating profits and thus capital rental rates
as11
pi =
(
θE
θK + φ(1− θK) +
(1− θE)φ
φθK + 1− θK
)(
ξEW
σKW
)
, (16)
pi∗ =
(
1− θE
1− θK + φθK +
θEφ
φ(1− θK) + θK
)(
ξEW
σKW
)
, (17)
where φ ≡ ϕ1−σ measures trade openness between the two regions with
φ = 0 indicating prohibitive trade barriers and φ = 1 free trade. World
expenditures are defined as EW ≡ E + E∗ and the world capital stock
as KW ≡ K + K∗ with θK and θE referring to the home shares of these
quantities.
At the symmetric equilibrium with θK = 1/2 and θE = 1/2, shifting
expenditure to home (dθE > 0) raises pi and lowers pi∗ since it increases the
home market size. A higher expenditure share therefore promotes agglom-
eration of capital at home because capital accumulates where the rental rate
is higher and decumulates in the other region. Production shifting to home
9See again Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009) for details of the derivations.
10Note that the number of varieties in the home region VH(t) is equal to the capital
stock at home K(t) because one variety exactly requires one unit of capital as fixed input
(analogously K∗(t) ≡ VF (t)).
11We ignore time arguments here. Note, moreover, that ξ = ξ∗ and σ = σ∗ due to
symmetry between regions. For further details of the derivations see again Grafeneder-
Weissteiner and Prettner (2009).
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(dθK > 0), on the other hand, has the opposite effects because it increases
competition in the home market (local competition effect). The relative
strength of both forces determines whether agglomeration processes set in
in a framework ignoring demographic change. In particular, Baldwin (1999)
shows that the pro-agglomerative force dominates for sufficiently high levels
of trade openness.
Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009) have already shown that an
overlapping generation structure with lifetime uncertainty introduces a cru-
cial third force working via the turnover correction term. Since a higher
capital stock in one region implies that dying individuals are on average
richer, the distributional effects are more severe relative to the region with
the lower capital stock. Consequently, the turnover of generations acts as
an anti-agglomerative force by reducing relative aggregate consumption ex-
penditure growth of the region with the higher capital stock. The crucial
question to be analyzed in the following sections is how the introduction
of a nonconstant population size, i.e. µ 6= β, affects this linkage between
demographic change and agglomeration. In particular, we investigate how
population aging as represented by declining fertility rates impacts upon
the spatial distribution of economic activity by simultaneously taking into
account the associated changes in the population growth rate.
3 The impact of demographic change on agglom-
eration
To assess whether and how demographic change impacts upon agglomeration
processes we analyze the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium
more thoroughly. If it turns out that this steady state is unstable, then any
slight perturbation will lead us away from an equal distribution of capital
and expenditures and thus result in agglomeration processes.
3.1 Long-run equilibrium
Using the rental rates from equations (16) and (17) reformulated as functions
of the variables e˜, e˜∗, k˜ and k˜∗ (see appendix B) as well as the equilibrium
wages from equation (13) in the per capita laws of motion of capital and con-
sumption expenditures (10) and (11) yields the following four dimensional
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system12
˙˜e =
[(
e˜
k˜ + φk˜∗
+
e˜∗φ
φk˜ + k˜∗
)(
ξ
aiσ
)
− δ − ρ
]
e˜− β(ρ+ µ)aik˜, (18)
˙˜e∗ =
[(
e˜∗
k˜∗ + φk˜
+
e˜φ
φk˜∗ + k˜
)(
ξ
aiσ
)
− δ − ρ
]
e˜∗ − β(ρ+ µ)aik˜∗,(19)
˙˜
k =
[(
e˜
k˜ + φk˜∗
+
e˜∗φ
φk˜ + k˜∗
)(
ξ
aiσ
)
− δ − β + µ
]
k˜ +
l˜
ai
− e˜
ai
, (20)
˙˜
k∗ =
[(
e˜∗
k˜∗ + φk˜
+
e˜φ
φk˜∗ + k˜
)(
ξ
aiσ
)
− δ − β + µ
]
k˜∗ +
l˜
ai
− e˜
∗
ai
. (21)
These four differential equations in the variables e˜, e˜∗, k˜ and k˜∗ fully de-
scribe the dynamics of our NEG model with overlapping generations and a
nonconstant population size. Note that they nest both the Baldwin (1999)
set-up with β = µ = 0 as well as the Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner
(2009) framework with β = µ > 0 as special cases. The latter will turn
out to be particularly useful when we try to isolate the effect of population
growth on agglomeration tendencies.
Inserting the symmetric outcome e˜ = e˜∗ and k˜ = k˜∗ into the above
system indeed reveals that it is a steady state with the equilibrium values
given by13
¯˜e =
l˜σ ((δ − µ)√σ (A+B) + β ((δ + ρ− 2µ)σ + 2(µ+ ρ)ξ +A√σ))
2((δ − µ)σ + βξ)((β + δ + ρ)σ − (µ+ ρ)ξ) ,
(22)
¯˜
k =
l˜ ((ρσ −√σA)(σ − ξ) + 2σξ(β − µ) + δσ(σ + ξ))
2ai((δ − µ)σ + βξ)((β + δ + ρ)σ − (µ+ ρ)ξ) , (23)
where A ≡√σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4β(µ+ ρ)ξ and B ≡ (δ + ρ)√σ.
3.2 Formal stability analysis
To analyze the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium we first
linearize the non-linear dynamic system given in equations (18), (19), (20)
12We again suppress time arguments here. Note, moreover, that we have l˜ = l˜∗, µ = µ∗,
β = β∗ ai = a∗i , δ = δ
∗ and ρ = ρ∗ due to symmetry between regions.
13These and most of the following results were derived with Mathematica. The cor-
responding files are available from the authors upon request. Note also that we restrict
attention to the economically meaningful solution pair, i.e. where consumption and capital
is positive for plausible parameter values.
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and (21) around the symmetric equilibrium (22) and (23), and then evaluate
the eigenvalues of the corresponding 4× 4 Jacobian matrix
Jsym =
(
J1 J2
J3 J4
)
, (24)
where the four symmetric 2 × 2 sub-matrices Ji for i = 1, . . . , 4 are given
in appendix C (for this classical approach of stability analysis see e.g. the
appendix on mathematical methods in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004)).
Solving the characteristic equation yields the following four eigenvalues
eig1 =
1
2
(r1 −
√
rad1), (25)
eig2 =
1
2
(r1 +
√
rad1), (26)
eig3 =
1
2(φ+ 1)2
√
σ
(r2 −
√
rad2), (27)
eig4 =
1
2(φ+ 1)2
√
σ
(r2 +
√
rad2), (28)
where
r1 ≡ A√
σ
− β − δ + µ,
rad1 ≡
(
A√
σ
+ β + δ − µ
)2
+
(σ − ξ)
(
(A+B)2 + 4β(µ+ ρ)ξ
)
σξ
,
r2 ≡
√
σ
(
µ− β(φ+ 1)2 − δ (2φ2 + φ+ 1)+ φ(µ(φ+ 2)− ρ(φ− 1)))
+A(3φ+ 1),
rad2 ≡
(
A(φ− 1) + (µ(φ+ 1)2 − β(φ+ 1)2 + δ(φ− 1) + φ(φ+ 3)ρ)√σ)2 +
(φ+ 1)((φ+ 1)σ + (φ− 1)ξ)
(
4β(µ+ ρ)ξ(φ+ 1)2 + (φ− 1)2 (A+B)2
)
ξ
.
The nature and signs of these eigenvalues fully characterize the system’s local
dynamics around the symmetric equilibrium. First it is easily established
that all four eigenvalues are real since both rad1 and rad2 are nonnegative
for all possible parameter values.14 Turning to the signs of the eigenvalues,
the analysis is more involved. Indeed, the above eigenvalues can be used to
assess the effects of demographic change on the stability properties of the
14Recall the parameter ranges µ > 0, β > 0, δ > 0, σ > 1, ρ > 0, 0 < ξ < 1 and
0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 which also imply that A > 0 and B > 0. In particular, note that σ > ξ.
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symmetric equilibrium for all three cases of growing population, i.e. β > µ,
shrinking population, i.e. β < µ, and a constant population size, i.e. β = µ.
The last scenario has already been investigated in Grafeneder-Weissteiner
and Prettner (2009), who show that in this case eigenvalue three is decisive
for the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium. In particular, the
system is saddle path stable only for parameter ranges that yield a negative
eigenvalue three.
For the case of positive population growth, i.e. β > µ, eigenvalue three
retains its crucial role, which becomes clear when checking the signs of the
remaining other eigenvalues. Note first, that the sign of r1 is ambiguous.15
As far as eigenvalue 1 is concerned, it is for sure nonpositive as long as r1 < 0.
For the case of r1 > 0, we can show that r21 < rad1 implying that eigenvalue
1 never gets positive. The last inequality moreover yields that eigenvalue 2,
on the other hand, is always nonnegative.16 Finally, turning to the sign of
eigenvalue 4, note first that r2 again does not have an unambiguous sign.17
For r2 ≥ 0, eigenvalue 4 is for sure nonnegative. Using Mathematica, it
is, however, possible to show that r2 +
√
rad2 > 0 even for negative r2
implying that eigenvalue 4 is nonnegative for all possible parameter ranges.
Summarizing, we have two positive and one negative eigenvalue. Both for
the case of constant population size and population growth the symmetric
equilibrium thus becomes unstable for parameter values, and in particular
birth and mortality rates, that yield a positive eigenvalue 3.
For the case of population shrinking, i.e. µ > β, only eigenvalue 2 and 4
have unambiguous signs. Note first, that r1 > 0 if µ > β which immediately
proves the nonnegativity of eigenvalue 2. Similarly, it can be shown that
r2 > 0 if µ > β18 implying that eigenvalue 4 is always nonnegative as well.
Thus, for the case of population shrinking, agglomeration processes will
set in for birth or mortality rates for which at least either eigenvalue 1 or
eigenvalue 3 is positive.
15In particular, r1 becomes negative for sufficiently high β.
16For r1 > 0 this follows trivially, r
2
1 < rad1 also shows it for r1 < 0.
17In particular, r2 becomes negative for sufficiently high β.
18This follows from rewriting
r2 = A(3φ+ 1) +
√
σ
(−δ (2φ2 + φ+ 1)+ φρ(1− φ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 1
+
√
σ
(−β(φ+ 1)2 + µ+ φµ(φ+ 2))︸ ︷︷ ︸
term 2
and noting that term 1 is nonnegative for all parameter ranges (see Grafeneder-Weissteiner
and Prettner (2009) for details) while term 2 is nonnegative as long as µ ≥ β.
14
Since the above findings illustrate that demographic change, i.e. varia-
tions in β and µ, can only influence the stability properties of the symmetric
equilibrium via eigenvalue 3 for the case of β ≥ µ and eigenvalues 1 and 3 for
β < µ, it is immediate to investigate them more thoroughly. Figures 1 and
2, which plot the contour lines of eigenvalues 1 and 3 for different birth and
mortality rates19, show that both of them switch their sign depending on the
economies’ demographic parameters. For the case of population shrinking,
i.e. β < µ, note moreover that for all combinations of β and µ for which
eigenvalue 3 switches sign, eigenvalue 1 is still negative. These observations
immediately result in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The possibility of agglomeration crucially hinges on the
economies’ demographic properties. In particular, both the birth and the
mortality rate are decisive for the stability properties of the symmetric equi-
librium.
Proof. See figures 1 and 2 and above arguing on the eigenvalues’ signs.
Proposition 1 extends Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009)’s re-
sult that with β = µ agglomeration processes crucially depend on the mor-
tality rate. In a setting with nonconstant population size it is both the birth
and the mortality rate that determine the stability properties of the sym-
metric equilibrium. Consequently, in order to fully understand the linkage
between demographic change and agglomeration, we must investigate how
changes in either of them impact upon agglomeration tendencies. The next
section precisely deals with this question.
3.3 Agglomeration processes in aging societies
In the framework with constant population size of Grafeneder-Weissteiner
and Prettner (2009), changes in µ and thus β only change the population age
structure. With β 6= µ, varying either of them, however, also changes the
population growth rate. In particular, declines in the birth rate imply both
population aging and a lower population growth rate, whereas changes in
19Figures 1 and 2 are plotted for δ = 0.05, ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3, σ = 4 and φ = 0.98.
Note the we use different ranges of µ and β to focus on the parameter region where the
eigenvalues switch sign.
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Figure 1: Contour plot of eigenvalue 3
the mortality rate leave the mean age unchanged20 and only alter population
growth (see chapter 7 in Preston et al. (2001)). In order to assess agglom-
eration tendencies in aging societies we thus focus on the case of declining
birth rates. Moreover, by additionally investigating how the mortality rate
impacts upon the stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium, we gain
important insights with respect to the population growth based channel on
agglomeration.
Figure 1 has already indicated the qualitative effect of declining birth
and mortality rates on agglomeration processes. Eigenvalue 3 decreases in
the birth rate and increases in the mortality rate. Figures 3 and 421 confirm
this observation by plotting eigenvalue 3 as a function of trade openness for
different β and µ. Only for sufficiently low β or high µ we can find levels of
20This can be easily shown by noting that the proportion of the population at age t− t0
is given by N(t0,t)
N(t)
= βe−β(t−t0) which is independent of µ. Intuitively, a lower mortality
rate on the one hand decreases the tendency to die more quickly and thus makes the
population older but on the other hand also increases the population growth rate which
exactly offsets the individual aging effect by making the population younger.
21Figures 3 and 4 are plotted for δ = 0.05, ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3 and σ = 4. For figure 3
we moreover fix µ = 0.001 and for figure 4 we set β = 0.001.
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Figure 2: Contour plot of eigenvalue 1
economic integration for which eigenvalue 3 gets positive and the symmetric
equilibrium becomes unstable.22
Declining fertility rates leading to an older population age structure and
lower population growth rates at the same time thus destabilize the symmet-
ric equilibrium, i.e. population aging strengthens agglomeration processes.
This is in line with Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009) who show
that with β = µ, increasing µ (and thus also β) above zero (which leads
to a younger population structure while leaving the population growth rate
unchanged) and thus allowing for a turnover of generations, considerably
stabilizes the symmetric equilibrium such that for plausible demographic
structures agglomeration processes do not set in. This last observation turns
out to also hold in the present setting with nonconstant population size: for
a plausible mortality rate of µ = 0.0125 resulting in a life expectancy of 80
22This also holds for the case of population shrinking, since, as figures 1 and 2 indicate,
the parameter range within which eigenvalue 1 is positive is a subset of the correspond-
ing one of eigenvalue 3. Thus eigenvalue 3 is decisive for the stability properties of the
symmetric equilibrium even for the case of a shrinking population.
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Figure 3: Eigenvalue 3 as a function of φ for varying β
Figure 4: Eigenvalue 3 as a function of φ for varying µ
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years23 agglomeration processes never take place as long as β > 0.00051.24
A fertility rate below such a value would clearly be at odds with reality.25
While the birth rate mimics the effects of demographic change on ag-
glomeration found in a setting with constant population size, the mortality
rate’s impact is completely opposite. In particular, lower mortality rates
decrease eigenvalue 3 and thus make the symmetric equilibrium more sta-
ble. Since changes in the mortality and birth rate affect population growth
differently, it is immediate to suspect a population growth based channel
to augment the effects of the turnover of generations, which Grafeneder-
Weissteiner and Prettner (2009) have identified as the only link between
demographic change and agglomeration in a setting with constant popula-
tion size. Indeed, equation (10) clearly shows that the turnover correction
term increases in both demographic parameters implying that declining µ
and β should both strengthen agglomeration processes. Lower birth rates,
however, decrease the population growth rate, while lower mortality rates
increase it. The above findings thus suggest that population growth rate
declines as resulting from lower β act as an additional agglomeration force,
while population growth rate increases due to lower µ stabilize the symmetric
equilibrium. For declining birth rates, the population growth based channel
simply reinforces the turnover effect, while it counteracts and even dominates
the turnover channel for the case of declining mortality rates. Moreover, by
recalling that contemporaneous increases in the birth and mortality rate
increase stability (see Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009)), we can
also conclude that the birth rate effect dominates the mortality rate effect
for the case of constant population size. The next subsection is devoted to
verifying this additional population growth based channel on agglomeration
processes.
3.4 The population growth effect
Since Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009) have shown that with
β = µ demographic change only affects the symmetric equilibrium’s stabil-
ity properties via the turnover channel, it is possible to isolate the effects
of changes in the population growth rate on agglomeration tendencies by
23Since the probability of death during each year equals µ, average life expectancy is 1
µ
.
24We again set δ = 0.05, ρ = 0.015, ξ = 0.3, σ = 4 for this calculation.
25A birth rate of β = 0.00051 would imply 0.00051 children per individual.
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Figure 5: Instability region (φbreak1 and φbreak2) for constant and varying
population size
comparing the instability regions of constant to those of varying population
size. This is achieved in figure 5 which plots the instability region as a func-
tion of the birth rate for the case of zero and the case of positive or negative
population growth.26 In particular, the borders of the instability region
are given by the critical levels of economic integration φbreak1 and φbreak2
(see Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009) for details) within which
eigenvalue 3 is positive and thus agglomeration processes may set in.27
Figure 5 confirms our above mentioned presumptions about the effects of
changes in the population growth rate. We see that for positive population
growth, i.e. β > 0.003, the instability region gets smaller compared to
the case of constant population size, whereas it increases for the case of
population shrinking, i.e. β < 0.003. This identifies population growth as an
26Note that we now use slightly different parameter values, i.e. δ = 0.1, ρ = 0.1, ξ = 0.4,
σ = 2, to increase the visibility of the population growth effect. For the varying population
size case, we fix µ at 0.003.
27Recall that even for the case of population shrinking, eigenvalue 3 is decisive for the
stability properties of the symmetric equilibrium since the instability region implicitly
defined by eigenvalue 1 is a subset of the instability region defined by eigenvalue 3.
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additional dispersion force fostering a more equal distribution of productive
factors and explaining the differential impact of β and µ on agglomeration
processes.
Figure 5 also suggests one qualification to Grafeneder-Weissteiner and
Prettner (2009)’s main finding that agglomeration processes are consider-
ably reduced for positive birth and mortality rates. Indeed, for sufficiently
strong population shrinking, i.e. µ > β > 0, the instability region is big-
ger than for the case of µ = β = 0 (as represented by the solid line for
β = 0). Only for the case of a nonnegative population growth rate agglom-
eration tendencies are thus for sure reduced compared to a setting ignoring
demographic structures.
To gain some economic intuition about the particular channel via which
population growth impacts upon agglomeration processes, it is useful to re-
consider the more informal way of checking the stability properties of the
symmetric equilibrium followed by Baldwin (1999). This informal way is
based on investigating how an exogenous perturbation of the home share of
capital, θK , influences the home capital rental rate relative to the foreign
capital rental rate. A positive impact implies instability as capital accumu-
lation would be fostered in the home relative to the foreign region.
Overall, there are four channels via which capital shifting changes the
capital rental rate. The first two are the standard anti-agglomerative local
competition effect and the pro-agglomerative demand-linked circular causal-
ity first introduced by Baldwin (1999). The latter shows that a higher share
of capital in one region increases, via higher wealth levels, expenditures and
thus operating profits, i.e. capital rental rates, which speeds up capital ac-
cumulation. The former, on the other hand, captures the negative impact
of agglomeration of capital, i.e. firms, on capital rental rates due to more
severe competition (see section 2.3).
In a setting allowing for demographic change in terms of both popula-
tion aging and varying population size, two additional forces linked to the
economies’ demographic parameters β and µ appear. First, there is the anti-
agglomerative turnover effect (see again section 2.3). An exogenous rise in
the home capital share increases wealth and thus expenditure levels of in-
dividuals being currently alive in the home region relative to foreign-based
individuals. The negative distributional effects on per capita expenditures
resulting from birth and death, i.e. the replacement of dying individuals by
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newborns whose consumption expenditures are lower since they have zero
wealth levels, are thus more pronounced in the home region. This, in turn,
decreases the home expenditure share and therefore relative profitability and
capital rental rates.
Both higher birth and mortality rates strengthen this first force between
demography and agglomeration, which is in sharp contrast to the population
growth based channel that additionally affects the linkage between capital
shifting and the capital rental for β 6= µ. As already indicated in section
2.2, the impact of β and µ in the law of motion of per capita capital is of
opposite sign. In particular, equation (11) clearly shows that the market rate
of return on capital piw(t)ai − δ−β+µ depends negatively on n ≡ β−µ. The
wealth increase due to higher capital income resulting from capital shifting
is thus less pronounced the larger is n. This decreased impact upon wealth
translates into lower expenditure increases and finally lower increases in the
capital rental rate which precisely explains the anti-agglomerative effect of
population growth.
4 Concluding remarks
The model presented in this paper sheds more light on the linkage between
demographic change and agglomeration. In particular, it analyzes agglom-
eration processes in aging societies and identifies the channels via which
demographic developments influence the spatial distribution of economic
activity. We extend the framework of Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner
(2009), that already incorporates an overlapping generation structure and
lifetime uncertainty in the constructed capital model of Baldwin (1999), by
additionally allowing for a nonconstant population size. Changes in either
the birth or mortality rate are thus accompanied by changes in the pop-
ulation growth rate. Since population growth per se acts as an important
dispersion force and fertility and mortality have opposite effects on this rate,
their impacts with respect to the spatial distribution of economic activity
also differ. In particular, declining fertility rates strengthen agglomeration
processes while declining mortality rates weaken them.
Our framework is suited to assess the possibility of agglomeration ten-
dencies for various demographic developments. Most relevant for industri-
alized countries is probably the one of declining fertility rates leading to
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both population aging and slower population growth. We find that in such
a situation agglomeration tendencies are strengthened but still weaker than
in a setting that fully ignores demographic structures. In particular, our
calibrations suggest that also these countries are currently far away from a
situation where catastrophic agglomeration is likely to occur.
Despite the fact that allowing for population growth constitutes one fur-
ther step toward a more comprehensive understanding of the interrelations
between demographic change and agglomeration, many issues still remain
open. The above findings e.g. indicate the need for analyzing the combined
effect of varying birth and mortality rates. In particular, having the opposite
effects of birth and mortality rates on agglomeration processes in mind, it
is immediate to ask what happens if an economy faces both declining birth
and mortality rates. Our results suggest that the answer to this question
will crucially depend on the resulting change in the population growth rate
and requires a direct comparison of the quantitative effects of changing birth
and mortality rates.
Finally, recognizing the tight link between the spatial distribution of
economy activity and economic growth perspectives, it is worth investigat-
ing how demographic structures impact upon regional growth rates. Since
demography has been shown to be of crucial importance for agglomeration,
it is immediate to also investigate its effects on the growth impacts of such
concentration tendencies. This requires a NEG framework that allows for
both demographic change and endogenous long-run growth, a task being on
the top of our research agenda.
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Appendix
A Aggregation over individuals
A.1 Cohort size
Since e−µ(t−t0) is the probability of an individual of a cohort born at t0 to
survive to time t and the cohort size of newborns is given by N(t0, t0) =
βN(t0), the size of a cohort born at t0 at time t can be rewritten as
N(t0, t) = βN(t0)e−µ(t−t0)
= βN(0)ent0e−µ(t−t0)
= βN(0)e(β−µ)t0e−µ(t−t0)
= βN(0)eβt0e−µt
= βeβt0e−µt, (29)
where we use that population size N(t) grows with n = β − µ and we
normalize N(0) = 1.
A.2 Aggregate expenditures and capital
To obtain the laws of motion of per capita expenditures and capital, we
must first derive the aggregate consumption rule and the aggregate law of
motion of capital. First, note that individual utility maximization yields the
individual consumption expenditures rule28
e(t0, t) = (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)[k(t0, t) + h(t)], (30)
where
h(t) ≡
∫ ∞
t
l
ai
e−R
A(t,τ)dτ (31)
is human wealth of individuals in capital units, i.e. the present value of
lifetime wage income with the annuity factor e−RA(t,τ) ≡ e−
∫ τ
t
(
pi(s)
w(s)ai
+µ−δ
)
ds
used for discounting. Optimal individual consumption expenditures in the
planning period t in capital units, e(t0,t)aiw(t) , are proportional to total wealth
with the marginal propensity to consume out of total wealth being constant
and equal to the effective rate of time preference ρ+µ. As will become clear
28For details of the derivations see Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2009)
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soon, it is also necessary to derive an expression for the law of motion of in-
dividual human wealth being equal to per capita human wealth.29 Applying
twice the Leibniz rule to equation (31) yields
˙˜
h(t) = h˙(t) = − l
ai
+
∫ ∞
t
l
ai
e−R
A(t,τ)(−1)
[
−
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
+ µ− δ
)]
dτ
=
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
+ µ− δ
)
h(t)− l
ai
. (32)
Using equation (30) in equation (9) yields the aggregate consumption
expenditure rule
E(t) = β
∫ t
−∞
(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)[k(t0, t) + h(t)]e−µt+βt0dt0
= β(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)e−µt
∫ t
−∞
[k(t0, t) + h(t)]eβt0dt0
= (ρ+ µ)aiw(t) [K(t) +H(t)] , (33)
where
H(t) = βe−µt
∫ t
−∞
h(t)eβt0dt0 = h(t)e(β−µ)t (34)
represents aggregate human wealth.
The law of motion of aggregate capital can be obtained from equation
(8) by again applying the Leibniz rule as
K˙(t) = β
k(t, t)e(β−µ)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
−0
+
β
[∫ t
−∞
k˙(t0, t)eβt0e−µtdt0 +
∫ t
−∞
k(t0, t)eβt0e−µ(−µ)dt0
]
= −µK(t) +
β
∫ t
−∞
(
w(t)l + pi(t)k(t0, t)− e(t0, t)
w(t)ai
+ (µ− δ)k(t0, t)
)
eβt0e−µtdt0
= −µK(t) + L(t)
ai
− E(t)
w(t)ai
+
pi(t)
w(t)ai
K(t) + µK(t)− δK(t)
=
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)
K(t) +
L(t)
ai
− E(t)
w(t)ai
, (35)
29With age independency, individual variables of course equal per capita variables, e.g.
h˜(t) = h(t) and l˜ = l.
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where we used the individual law of motion of capital given in equation (3)
to go from the first to the second line.30 In contrast to the individual law
of motion of capital (3), the aggregate law of motion for capital does not
feature the mortality rate, since µK(t) just captures the transfer of capital
of dying to surviving individuals by the life insurance companies which does
not change the rate of return on aggregate capital.
Based on this aggregate law of motion of capital we are now ready to
obtain the law of motion of per capita capital as
˙˜
k(t) = K˙(t)e−nt +K(t)e−nt(−n)
=
[(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)
K(t) +
L(t)
ai
− E(t)
w(t)ai
)
]
e−nt +K(t)e−nt(−n)
=
l˜
ai
− e˜(t)
w(t)ai
+
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)
k˜(t)− nk˜(t)
=
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − β + µ
)
k˜(t) +
l˜
ai
− e˜(t)
w(t)ai
.
Finally, the per capita Euler equation is obtained from differentiating
the per capita version of the aggregate consumption rule given in equation
(33) with respect to time and substituting in the per capita law of motions
of capital and human wealth. This yields
e˜(t) = (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
[
k˜(t) + h˜(t)
]
(36)
˙˜e(t) = (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
[ ˙˜
k(t) + ˙˜h(t)
]
= (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
[(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − n
)
k˜(t) +
l˜
ai
− e˜(t)
w(t)ai
]
+
(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
[(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ + µ
)
h˜(t)− l˜
ai
]
= (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
(
− e˜(t)
w(t)ai
)
+ (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)[
k˜(t) + h˜(t)
]
+
(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
[
−nk˜(t) + µh˜(t)
]
.
30Recall also that capital holdings of newborns k(t,t) are zero by assumption (no be-
quests).
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Substituting in e˜(t) from equation (36), we can rewrite ˙˜e(t) as
˙˜e(t) = (ρ+ µ) (−e˜(t)) + ˜e(t)
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)
+ (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
[
−nk˜(t) + µh˜(t)
]
=
[(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)
− (ρ+ µ)
]
e˜(t) + (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)µh˜(t)− n(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)k˜(t)
=
[(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ
)
− (ρ+ µ)
]
e˜(t) + (ρ+ µ)aiw(t)µ
[
e˜(t)
(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)
− k˜(t)
]
−n(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)k˜(t)
=
[
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − ρ
]
e˜(t) +
[
−µ(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)(k˜(t))− n(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)k˜(t)
]
=
[
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − ρ
]
e˜(t)− β(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)k˜(t),
where we used that h˜(t) = e˜(t)(ρ+µ)aiw(t) − k˜(t).
Therefore we have a two dimensional dynamic system of the following
form
˙˜e(t) =
[
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − ρ
]
e˜(t)− β(ρ+ µ)aiw(t)k˜(t)
˙˜
k(t) =
(
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − β + µ
)
k˜(t) +
l˜
ai
− e˜(t)
w(t)ai
with analogous equations holding in the foreign region.
Note, finally, that by using equation (36) and equation (30) for t0 = t
the law of motion of per capita consumption expenditures can be rewritten
as
˙˜e(t)
e˜(t)
=
[
pi(t)
w(t)ai
− δ − ρ
]
− β e˜(t)− e(t, t)
e˜(t)
=
e˙(t0, τ)
e(t0, τ)
− β e˜(t)− e(t, t)
e˜(t)
.
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B Derivation of rental rates
Rental rates given in equations (16) and (17) can be rewritten as31
pi =
(
E
K + φK∗
+
E∗φ
φK +K∗
)(
ξ
σ
)
,
pi∗ =
(
E∗
K∗ + φK
+
Eφ
φK∗ +K
)(
ξ
σ
)
.
By multiplying the nominator as well as the denominator by e−nt, we arrive
at
pi =
(
e˜
k˜ + φk˜∗
+
e˜∗φ
φk˜ + k˜∗
)(
ξ
σ
)
, (37)
pi∗ =
(
e˜∗
k˜∗ + φk˜
+
e˜φ
φk˜∗ + k˜
)(
ξ
σ
)
. (38)
C Intermediate results for the stability analysis
The Jacobian matrix Jsym, which is evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium
and given in equation (24), has the following entries Ji for i = 1, . . . , 4
J1 =
1
2(φ+ 1)
√
σ
(
A(φ+ 2)−Bφ φ(A+B)
φ(A+B) A(φ+ 2)−Bφ
)
,
J2 =
 −ai(φ2+1)(A+B)24(φ+1)2ξ − βai(µ+ ρ) −aiφ(A+B)22(φ+1)2ξ
−aiφ(A+B)2
2(φ+1)2ξ
−ai(φ
2+1)(A+B)2
4(φ+1)2ξ
− βai(µ+ ρ)
 ,
J3 =
1
ai(φ+ 1)σ
(
ξ − (φ+ 1)σ φξ
φξ ξ − (φ+ 1)σ
)
,
J4 =
 Aφ+√σ(−β(φ+1)2−δ(φ2+φ+1)+µ(φ+1)2+φρ)(φ+1)2√σ − φ(A+B)(φ+1)2√σ
− φ(A+B)
(φ+1)2
√
σ
Aφ+
√
σ(−β(φ+1)2−δ(φ2+φ+1)+µ(φ+1)2+φρ)
(φ+1)2
√
σ

with the parameter clusters A ≡ √σ(δ + ρ)2 + 4β(µ+ ρ)ξ as well as B ≡
(δ + ρ)
√
σ.
31Note that we suppress time arguments here.
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